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Quality Assurance and Hospital Structure:
How the Physician-Hospital Relationship
Affects Quality Measures
Ronald G. Spaeth', Kelley C. Pickering, and Shannon M. Webb2
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1999, a study released by the Institute of Medicine may have changed
the way we measure and evaluate quality health care. The report, To Err is
Human, suggested that the failure of the health care industry to adequately
monitor and correct quality problems was resulting in a dramatic toll on
patient health and safety. The Institute offered several solutions to address
the problems with quality, including the implementation of a "cleaner4
system" of self-review and governance within the health care facility itself.
Upon securing the endorsement of the Federal government, these proposed
solutions became the new front-page concerns for physicians, hospitals, and
health care providers throughout the country.5
Improving patient care became all the rage as health care institutions
struggled to establish themselves as "quality" caregivers. 6 Within the
hospital environment, sophisticated measures began to establish internal
quality control measures, including: (1) credentialing programs; (2) peer
review programs; (3) internal standards; (4) minimum numbers of cases
1. Mr. Spaeth joined Evanston Northwestern Health care in January 2000, when
Highland Park Hospital merged with Evanston Northwestern Health care. Prior to the
merger, Mr. Spaeth served as the President and Chief Executive Officer of Highland Park
Hospital for seventeen years. He received his B.A. from Western Reserve University and his
M.B.A. from the University of Chicago. Mr. Spaeth is currently a member of the Board of
Commissioners of the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health care Organizations.
2. Kelley C. Pickering and Shannon M. Webb are both graduating with J.D. degrees in
May 2003 from Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Both are candidates for the
Health Law Certificate, and are Article Editors for the Annals of Health Law.
3. See generally COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To ERR IS
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, (LINDA T. KOHN ET AL., eds., 2000)
(commenting throughout the book about the quality of health care in America).
4. See id. at 5-15.
5. See e.g., Agency for Health care Research & Quality, http://www.ahrq.gov; see also
Nat'l Ctr. for Patient Safety, http://www.patientsafety.gov/vision.html.
6. See generally id. (providing information to providers).
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performed; and (5) hospital wide policies, such as those suggested by The
Leapfrog Group,7 to supervise the physicians and evaluate their
performance. These programs sought to promote a greater quality of health
care through peer assessment, and the encouragement of self-policing and
whistle-blowing.8
The hospital-physician relationship, essentially an
employer-employee bond, has in turn changed through the implementation
of such procedures in hospitals around the country.
This paper will give a structural illustration of today's more multifaceted
hospital environment and explain how the quality-driven processes of peer
review, credentialing, and standards work in both the typically smaller
community hospital setting, and the generally larger university-affiliated
institution. Problems with this system will be described, as well as the
ever-present involvement of medical malpractice concerns. The conclusion
presents several alternatives that could serve as possible solutions to these
quality-driven quandaries.
II. CREDENTIALING AND PEER REVIEW
Today's hospitals are structurally complicated as a result of the struggle
for quality. The main administrative body serves as the governing board
that is responsible for overseeing the activities of the hospital and is
centrally concerned with meeting quality guidelines. Interestingly enough,
however, until recently it has generally been comprised chiefly or entirely
of non-physicians. 9 This requires the board to rely on the hospital's staff
physicians to evaluate their co-workers' job performances as a necessary
step for the hospital to achieve quality care.'l
Two means of such
evaluation are through credentialing and peer review, both of which are
principally the physicians' responsibilities."
Credentialing refers to the process of determining whether to make a
physician a member of the hospital staff. This is done by means of an
investigation, followed by further analysis every two years to decide
whether reappointment is appropriate. 2 The credentialing committees refer
to past performance and recommendations from peer physicians to

7. See The Leapfrog Group for Patient Safety, at http://www.leapfroggroup.org/
consumerintro2.htm.
8. See generally Jason M. Healy et al., Confidentiality of Health Care ProviderQuality
of Care Information, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 595 (2002).
9. Paul L. Scibetta, Restructuring Hospital-PhysicianRelations: Patient Care Quality
Depends on the Health of Hospital PeerReview, 51 U. PIr. L. REv. 1025, 1031-32 (1990).
10. Id. at 1032.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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determine if the individual is fit to practice in that facility.' 3 Peer review is
a similar process, conducted on a continual basis within the hospital and the
departmental settings. The goal of the peer review process is to ensure
quality care through consistent monitoring of physicians by their peers, who
determine incompetence through evidence of a pattern of inadequate care."
Many states have protected peer review participants through legislation
aimed at encouraging the "free flow of information without threat of
reprisal in the form of civil liability."' 6 In 1986, Congress enacted The
Health Care Quality Improvement Act ("HCQIA"), aimed at providing
incentives to physicians to actively engage in peer reviewing programs."
HCQIA works in conjunction with those state statutes to provide qualified
immunities to peer reviewers, and it also requires that all findings be
reported to a national clearinghouse.' 8 Despite these protections, however,
physicians and hospitals still face a myriad of difficulties brought on by
these procedures.
The hospital's governing board is ultimately responsible for any harm or
risk of injury to patients. '9 However, the assessment of the quality of a
physician's work can often only be properly determined by someone who
practices within the same specialty.2 ° Thus, from the hospital's perspective,
the level of quality provided to patients depends upon how well the
processes of credentialing and peer review are carried out by their
physicians." Hospitals must continually strive to eliminate the barriers to
these processes and struggle to streamline the methods, encouraging the
physicians' timely reporting efforts and perfecting the means of discovering
and addressing quality concerns.
However, there are significant impediments to the processes of peer
review and credentialing on participating physicians. Major barriers to the
smooth and efficient operation of these processes include: the fear of

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.
16.

Id.
Browning v. Burt, 613 N.E.2d 993, 1007 (Ohio 1993); Katherine T. Stukes, The

Medical Peer Review Privilege After Virmani, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1860, 1862-64 (2002);
Steven D. Williger & Maynard A. Buck, A World of Privilege and Immunity, 49-JAN. FED.
LAW.

17.
18.
19.

32, 32-33 (2002).
Stukes, supra note 16, at 1868-69.
Williger & Buck, supra note 16, at 32.
Scibetta, supra note 9, at 1032.

20. Id.
21.
Stukes, supra note 16, at 1862-64.
22. Teresa L. Salamon, When Revoking Privilege Leads to Invoking Privilege: Whether
There is a Need to Recognize a Clearly Defined Medical Peer Review Privilegein Virmani v.
Novant Health, Inc., 47 VILL. L. REV. 643, 645 (2002).
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subsequent personal lawsuits, the effect on referrals, the lack of
compensation for participating physicians, and the social tensions that
accompany adverse recommendations. 23 All hospitals, large and small
alike, must face these obstacles, because the smooth and efficient operation
of credentialing and peer review are critical to assuring quality; yet, the
specific structure of the smaller community hospital creates even more
tensions in the "employment" relationship between the physicians and the
hospital board, and their endless quest for quality improvement.
III. QUALITY CONTROL IN DIFFERENT HOSPITAL STRUCTURES
The majority of hospitals in our country today "employ" voluntary
medical staffs. These facilities, typically known as community hospitals,
function with no employer-physician employee relationship and in a nonacademic setting. It is therefore readily distinguishable from the universityaffiliated hospitals. These differences, however, create very diverse
environments and quality measures within the institution, as each structure
faces unique challenges in their pursuit for quality.
Within most American hospitals, physicians are organized by their area
of expertise into departments. Each department has a chairperson, a
physician member of that department who serves to oversee the department
and the other doctors, while keeping the administration abreast of any
quality concerns. This individual is responsible for credentialing his or her
members and running the department. This is, essentially, the structure of
peer review within the hospital. The intention is to ensure that patients are
receiving quality care from competent and knowledgeable physicians. Any
deviation from the standard of care by one physician should spark whistleblowing by others in his or her department, which would then proceed
through the structural hierarchy - from department chair, to hospital
administration, and finally to the board. However, the differences between
the university and community hospitals can produce very different results
when these processes are applied.
A. The University Hospital
University hospitals are typically very prominent both as care facilities
and research centers. Often, affiliating your name with a university hospital
carries more meaning - and perhaps more business - for a physician.
Department chairs are typically recruited from outside the institution by the
medical school, rather than elected from the hospital staff by the department
members. They are typically highly-regarded people in their fields of
23.

Scibetta, supra note 9, at 1033-35.
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expertise. They are also compensated for their work as chairs, and are
heavily marketed by the hospital so the individual receives recognition that
may boost personal success. Moreover, in a university hospital, the
position generally has no term limit. Therefore, the chairperson is not
generally concerned that the position will be refilled after a year with
another department member.
Thus, individuals serving as department chairs for a group of physicians
in a university hospital are often not equal peers with their department
members. They command a higher salary; are generally in a permanent
position; are specifically recruited by the administration-university for the
title; are recognized and therefore marketed by the hospital and the
university; and often split time between their roles as physicians,
professors, and researchers. While the processes of credentialing and peer
review undeniably will cause tensions between peer workers in any setting,
the distinction between the department chair and his or her physician
members is clearly delineated by the university hospital administration and
structure. The differences between the positions in such a setting are
generally considered acceptable, thus creating less friction for the peer
review and credentialing procedures. The hospital can thus benefit more
freely from operating quality control mechanisms that are conducted more
smoothly.
B. The Community Hospital
Community hospitals are structured much more differently than the
university institutions. These distinctions create very different qualityseeking environments. Community hospitals pull the department chairs
from their existing staff, holding elections among physicians within the
departments. This creates a tension nonexistent in the university hospital
setting, as physicians must choose a chairperson from among their own
ranks to oversee and manage them. This chairperson, who does not
necessarily have any more expertise or tenure over his or her department
members, is responsible for addressing quality issues, reprimanding doctors
for errors, and assuming the responsibility of running the department and
actively striving for higher quality work product from its members. This all
has to be done under the microscope of the department members and the
hospital administration.
Additionally, the community hospital generally does not pay the
department chair any additional compensation for his or her efforts, and is
not structured to do so, even though the position requires extra work and
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long hours, keeping the doctor at work but away from his or her patients.24
The community hospital does not market the individual openly to the
community as a department chair, as this would be seen as an unfair act of
favoritism, or even as antitrust by the other members of the department.
Additionally, the position as chair is not indefinite. New elections are held
every one to two years, which means that a newly-elected physician has
barely served as chair when considerations for the next chairperson are
being made. This regular turnover causes problems, especially if the
embittered department member who was reprimanded ends up as the new
chair just one year later.
While this structure may function well in the university hospital setting,
it seems somehow contrary to achieving quality in the community hospital
environment. Where no compensation or community recognition is offered
for increased responsibilities, and personal discord and strife are likely to
emerge, what is the incentive for chairs to report quality problems and bring
more negative attention upon themselves? This also poses a problem for
doctors, such as specialists, who rely heavily on their peers'
recommendations to patients for income. Once a rift is created between
physicians as a result of an adverse peer review recommendation, many
doctors find themselves biting the hand that feeds them. This is the case
since they are effectively cutting off an often significant income stream that
they had previously enjoyed. Ironically, from a patient's perspective, this
means that the very methods employed by hospitals and physicians to
improve health care quality might deprive a patient of an appropriate
referral, merely because of personal tensions or a soured relationship
between two physicians.
IV. LIABILITY ISSUES AND THEORIES

Among the barriers posing threats to the efficiency of credentialing and
peer review are concerns about personal litigation stemming from these
processes.25 While state statutes and HCQIA specifications limit some of
the liability,26 physicians are still concerned with both defending their
credibility, should it be called into question by fellow physicians, and with
insulating themselves from lawsuits, should their assessment of another
doctor backfire. This proves to be another challenge to the hospital: how to
encourage physicians to continue blowing the whistle on inadequate care,

24. George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial
Costs of Medical PeerReview Protection,52 ALA. L. REv. 723, 727-29 (2001).

25.

Scibetta, supra note 9, at 1033-34.

26. Id.; Willinger & Buck, supra note 16, at 32-33 (discussing protections afforded
under HCQIA).
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despite the potential threat of personal liability, while at the same time
providing physicians a forum to be heard, should they need to defend their
own actions against their peers.
A. The Antitrust Theory
Several legal theories have risen out of this precarious relationship, and
physicians discharged from hospitals as a result of peer review effort have
brought suits against both the institution and the doctors involved.27 Some
of these suits have been brought under an antitrust theory, where disciplined
physicians have sued both the reviewing doctor and the hospital, claiming
the peer review was done with the intent to reduce the number of competing
physicians in the reviewer's practice group. 28 By reporting to the hospital
board that a peer was failing to provide quality care, the reviewing
physician effectively eliminated any other doctors with whom they were
competing for patients and privileges.29
Assuming they can show that their recommendations to the hospital were
made in good faith, generally, suits under an antitrust theory have failed
because of the implementation of state statutes providing immunity to
reviewing physicians. 3 However, even with this protective legislation in
place, many physicians still find the thought of defending their
recommendations in a court a severe deterrent to notifying the hospital
board of a peer's inadequate performance. 3' Thus, hospital measures to
improve quality care are chilled to the extent the physicians are reluctant to
become involved, due to the risk of being entangled in a lawsuit.
B. The Due Process Theory
Discharged physicians have been much more successful bringing suits
under a due process theory of law.32 This claim can be used by a doctor
who has been terminated from a hospital staff, or who has been refused
appointment. 3 Essentially, physicians argue that they were denied fair
procedure in the decision-making process of the hospital board.34 While
27. See Scibetta, supra note 9, at 1039.
28. Id. at 1034.
29. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (holding that the state action
doctrine did not protect peer review activities from application of the federal antitrust laws
where a surgeon brought an action against physicians, alleging violations of the Sherman Act
and interference with prospective employment).
30. Scibetta, supra note 9, at 1034.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1035.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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this is a constitutionally-grounded argument, thus applicable to public
hospitals by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it has also been applied
to private institutions under common law and contract theory." The courts
have decided that hospitals may not make an arbitrary exclusion, but must
provide the individual with a hearing and appeal process, much like a minitrial being held within the hospital.36 As a result of a number of successful
due process claims, hospitals often are compelled to institute a slew of
procedural safeguards for their physicians, quite often unnecessarily.37 This
results, however, in more barriers to the efficiency of the peer review
process. Money and resources the hospital spends on establishing these
safeguards and conducting hearings are therefore not available to fund and
improve the credentialing and peer review processes.38 Additionally, the
focus on preparing for an in-house hearing and establishing a case against a
physician solid enough to deter litigation discourages doctors from
participating actively in peer review. This perhaps silences many of the
recommendations that would be crucial to quality improvement in the
hospital.39
V. CONSEQUENCES

Due to the differences in hospital structure between the community and
university hospitals, the same measures used to obtain a higher quality of
care may often result in very opposite outcomes.
The effect of
credentialing and peer review in the community hospital may actually be
detrimental to the ultimate goal of quality improvement. Moreover, smaller
hospitals may find themselves better served by exploring new ways to
amend the peer review and credentialing processes to ensure patients
receive quality health care. Because of the measures hospitals must take to
encourage physician involvement in the reviewing procedures, and to.
protect those physicians' rights should they receive an adverse
recommendation, much of the effort is actually being focused away from
ensuring quality. Thus, this strongly suggests that smaller community
hospitals may require different peer review processes that are designed to
be more compatible with their unique structure and physician hospital
relationships.

35.

Id. at 1036.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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VI.

DISCOVERABILITY OF PEER REVIEW DOCUMENTS
IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SETTING

An additional hurdle in the process of achieving quality health care
through peer review is the physicians' fear that peer review documents may
be used against them in a negligence action brought by a third party.40
Indeed, despite current immunity and confidentiality legislation, it is not
uncommon for a large portion of the peer review documents to be
considered discoverable in a medical malpractice action.4 ' Taken together
with the lack of a federal cap on damages in medical malpractice cases,42
the situation clearly leads to a "chilling effect" in the peer review process. 43
To begin with, many of the peer review documents, created by mandate
in many cases, are discoverable in negligence actions brought by patients."
While it is true that many states have peer review privilege, immunity, and
confidentiality statutes that address this problem, 5 they do not go far
enough in easing the physicians' fears of litigation. 6 Specifically, many of
these statutes only protect those documents that are originally created in a
peer review committee.47 This leaves items such as patient charts, records,
billing information, and general medical error and safety information
discoverable. 8 Moreover, these peer review statutes vary greatly from one
state to another, which leads to inconsistent protections.
The federal government's response to the physicians' concerns,
regarding the discoverability of peer review documents, has been to enact
privacy legislation.0 Specifically, HCQIA was enacted in 1986 in an effort

40.

See Melissa Chiang, Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable Reporting

System, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 383, 396-97 (2001).

41. See Healy et al., supra note 8, at 597.
42. See Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (I11.1976).
43. Christina A. Graham, Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the State and
FederalPeer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 111, 113 (2000).
44. Healy et al., supra note 8, at 617-18; Susan 0. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis,
Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L.
& HEALTH 169, 182-92 (1993).
45. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 44, at 170-7 1; Joseph T. Butz & Dennis C. Waldon,
Protecting Physician Whistleblowers Under Illinois and Federal Law, 85 ILL. B.J. 328, 33031 (1997).
46. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 44, at 170-71.
47. Newton, supra note 24, at 731.
48. See Chiang, supra note 40, at 396-405; Bryan A. Liang, The Adverse Event of
UnaddressedMedical Error:Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health-Careand Legal
Systems, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHics 346, 351-52 (2001).
49. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 44, at 193-94.
50. Healy et al., supra note 8, at 631-32; see generally Susan L. Homer, The Health
Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions, Applications and
Implications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 455 (1990).
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to provide qualified immunity to individuals involved in peer review
committees.5 However, the quality control materials created by these same
committees are not provided for under the HCQIA.52 In 1996, the
government again enacted privacy legislation, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), which was partially aimed
at easing physicians' fear of peer review.53 HIPAA established new
safeguards for protecting individually identifiable medical information that
is "transmitted or maintained electronically or in any other form or
medium." 4 However, the structure of HIPAA does not necessarily provide
a true privilege or protection for medical care providers; it merely sets forth
confidentiality requirements.55
Furthermore, HIPAA mandates that
"patients have the right to inspect, copy, and amend their health-care
information; authorize or refuse to authorize its use; and receive a formal
accounting of how their information is used. 5 6 Clearly, both pieces of
federal legislation have failed to address all of the confidentiality, privilege,
and immunity concerns that face physicians involved in peer review or
quality control activities.
Generally, courts are reluctant to broadly read the provisions of the state
or federal peer review statutes." Therefore, the statutory language must
unambiguously grant the sought immunity or privilege in order for the court
to find the statute applicable.58 One reason behind this narrow interpretation
of legislation is the desire to balance the plaintiff's right to discovery with
the need for unfettered quality control and peer review processes in the
medical community. 9 Specifically, many scholars perceive the peer review
privilege as harmful to patients' malpractice claims, because they do not
have access to key peer review documents.60 On the other hand, many also
view the peer review privilege as a way to "level the judicial playing field"
in medical malpractice cases.6' Indeed, without this privilege plaintiffs
would be able to use any and all quality control and peer review documents,
createdby physicians, against a physician in a medical malpractice action.62
51. Homer, supra note 50, at 455; Newton, supra note 24, at 732.
52. Liang, supra note 48, at 352.
53. Healy et al., supra note 8, at 632-33.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 635.
56. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.524, 164.526, 164.528 (2000)); Liang, supra note 48, at 353.
57. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 44, at 176-77.
58. Id.
59. See Graham, supra note 43, at 113; Liang, supra note 48, at 353; Newton, supra note
24, at 736-37.
60. Graham, supra note 43, at 114-15.
61. Newton, supra note 24, at 737.
62. Id. at 736.
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These differing perspectives have almost always found the plaintiffs
right to discovery as the appropriate balance. 63 This right to discovery,
however, has led to a resurgence of medical malpractice actions and all the
negative consequences that attach, including increased malpractice
insurance premiums, higher health care costs, and decreased quality and
access to care. 64 Specifically, medical malpractice insurance premiums are
skyrocketing for many physicians, especially those practicing in obstetrics,
neurosurgery, and emergency medicine. 65 "Doctors alone spent $6.3 billion
last year to obtain coverage." 66 Indeed, "[e]ven where mistakes are not
made, the imperfections of our legal system sometimes permit patients with
bad outcomes to sustain legal actions, and even to recover damage
awards., 67 Therefore, physicians whom may have never even faced a
medical malpractice claim once in their careers are now forced to pay much
higher costs for malpractice insurance.68
This increase in insurance costs for physicians has led some physicians
to leave the health care field, and many more have chosen to move to states
where the malpractice damage awards are capped by state statutes. 69 The
negative consequences of such physician decisions are already being seen
in states where there are physician shortages. Some physicians have even
stopped performing medical procedures, such as delivering babies, because
of their high-risk nature.70 Clearly, access to care, quality or not, is being
threatened by the repercussions of the current medical malpractice
71
process.
Moreover, the total financial impact of the medical malpractice system in
many states merely begins with a discussion about physicians' rising
insurance premiums.
Other costs tied to malpractice liability that
physicians face are: (1) defensive medical costs; (2) liability-related
administrative costs, such as corporate compliance activities; and (3)
medical device and pharmaceutical liability costs that are passed on due to
63.

See Liang, supra note 48, at 353.

64.

See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE
CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
SYSTEM 1-2 (July 25, 2002), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/itrefm.htm
CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS].
Lawyers vs. Patients,WALL ST. J., October 1, 2002, at A20.
CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 64, at 6.

LIABILITY

[hereinafter

65.
66.
67. Charles M. Key, MaintainingProfessional Liability Insurance Coverage: Basicsfor
the Careful Shopper, 12 HEALTH LAWYER 23, 23-24 (1999).
68. CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 64, at 1.
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. at 1-3.
71. Id.
72. Healy et al., supra note 8, at 620.
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increasing manufacturer's insurance." All of these increased financial
pressures on physicians are then passed on to all Americans "through
higher premiums for health insurance..,
7 4 higher out-of-pocket payments
taxes.
higher
and
care,
obtain
they
when
One possibility in alleviating this crisis situation that has erupted is to
enact state and federal legislation that caps at least some aspect of medical
malpractice damages available to the plaintiff-patient.75 Several states, such
as California, have already enacted legislation that limits the amount of
non-economic damages available in a medical malpractice case. 76 The
states that have malpractice award caps also have significantly lower
malpractice insurance premiums, as the two are inextricably linked."
However, many states do not have malpractice award caps in effect and due
to the unpredictable nature of malpractice claims and awards, physicians in
those states are forced to pay the higher insurance premiums. 78
In response, on the federal front, there is legislation pending in the
Senate that would cap non-economic damages at $250,000. 79 This bill
would also set punitive damages at the greater of $250,000, or twice the
economic damages. ° Consequently, this legislation has the potential to
reduce medical malpractice premiums by twenty-five to thirty percent.
This reduction in cost to the physician would lead to lower health care costs
not only for the American people individually, but also for the government
as a whole.82
In the end, despite the potential for discovery of peer review documents
by third parties, by limiting the physicians' liability in medical malpractice
actions physicians may be more willing to participate in meaningful peer
review and quality control processes.
However, until the medical
malpractice awards are capped consistently across the country through
federal legislation, quality, cost, and access issues will prevail in many
states. Therefore, medical malpractice reform is a necessary measure that
should be taken in an effort to achieve higher quality medical care for all.

73.

Id.

74.

CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 64, at 6.

75.
76.

Id. at 12-14.
See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); CONFRONTING

THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 64, at 10-11.
77. CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 64, at 12-15; Lawyers vs.

Patients, supra note 65.
78.

CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 64, at 1, 12-14.

79.
80.
81.

Lawyers vs. Patients, supra note 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.

82.
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VII. CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The struggle for greater quality health care has become so complex that it
creates its own disincentives, especially within the community hospital
environment. It may be possible, however, to reconfigure the peer review
and quality control processes to better fit the unique structure of a
community hospital.
Specifically, an outside independent reviewing
agency could be created with specific input from the local medical
community and assigned to individual hospitals as a type of "risk
management" team.
This team would be composed of physicians;
however, the obstacles that would normally face a Department Chair or a
peer review committee would be alleviated because this physician team
would only be responsible for peer review.
Of course, this proposed solution does not address the issue of how the
documents used by this "stand-alone" quality review committee would be
protected from discovery in litigation. It is clear that individual state
statutes cannot provide the necessary protection for these documents, given
the current discoverability of many peer review documents.83 A federal
statute that sets forth a bright-line rule regarding quality control privileges,
immunities, and confidentiality must be enacted.
Moreover, in order to promote effective quality control processes in
health care, there must be a federally enacted cap on all medical malpractice
non-economic damages. The current legislation that is pending in the
Senate would be a vast departure from the state to state inconsistencies that
currently prevail in this area.4 Such legislation is absolutely necessary. It
is essential that federal legislation be enacted that addresses the health care
crisis that has been created by the continually skyrocketing medical
malpractice awards.85
In the end, quality health care is everyone's goal; therefore, we should be
committed to ensuring that the quality control and peer review processes are
effective for the hospital structure on which they are imposed. It is only by
addressing, and eventually overcoming, the obstacles to effective peer
review procedures that quality health care can be achieved in America.

83. See Butz & Waldon, supra note 45, at 330-31; Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 44, at
170-71.
84. See Lawyers vs. Patients,supra note 65.
85.

See CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 64, at 1-3.
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